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ABSTRACT 
The Hong Kong dollar fixed-income market is a small but sophisticated 
market but it is in a growing stage. One significant indicator of the credit risk of a 
fixed income instrument is the credit rating by international agency. In this paper, I 
will explore the constituents of credit risk, the rating guide of an international issuer 
by an international rating agency and the valuation of Hong Kong bonds. Primary 
and secondary data are used in this paper. My objective is to raise awareness of fair 
rating methods by rating agencies in the context of the Hong Kong debt market. 
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In this paper, I mainly focus on the valuation and credit rating ofHong Kong 
dollar bonds. In this introduction, I will briefly introduce the Hong Kong market 
structure and give a picture of how the Hong Kong market works. Then, in Chapter 
11，I will investigate the interaction of credit risk assessment by market pricing versus 
credit rating . I will describe J.P. Morgan's CreditMetrics, methodology that looks at 
the default and credit rating migration probability and a study of credit rating 
anomalies by Fridson and Garman. In Chapter EI, I will summarize how a credit 
agency, Standard & Poor，s, rates an international bond and the risk that involved. In 
Chapter IV, I will carry out a primary data study that prove the risk premium ofHong 
Kong dollar bonds is higher than that of a US dollar bonds. At last, I will conclude 
the result of this study. 
Market Structure 
The Hong Kong dollar fixed-income market is small but sophisticated/ 
Among millions of local organizations, only a few participate in the bond market. 
The purpose of most of the bonds issuing by both oflocal and foreign banks is to raise 
HKD funds to support their retail and corporate lending activities. The corporate 
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market is largely driven by expansion plans connected with the Greater China 
economic boom with the extent of borrower financing requirements surpassing the 
local markets. As the following table shows，Hong Kong fixed rate issues are 
composed oftwo types, Exchange Fund paper and non-Exchange Fund paper. 
Among the 238 new non Exchange Fund issues of fix-income instrument from 
1990 to 1998, less than halfof them are rated by international rating agencies. Within 
the issues that are rated, most are rated AAA grade (See Table 3)，the best quality 
rating. And an interesting finding is that most of the triple A issues are in 1998 and 
relate to supranationals issuing Hong Kong dollar debt to swap to US dollar debt. 
This period corresponds with the Asia economic turmoil when swap spreads 
expanded. The reason why the rating is not affected by the turmoil is that most of the 
issues are by Government, supranationals and local and foreign banks (Table 2). We 
found that the supranational issues are not affected by the turmoil and in fact used is 
to lower the cost ofUS dollar swapped fund. But the banks have reduced the number 
of issues after the turmoil. Besides, the tenor of the new issues tend to be longer term 
debt except in 98, most of the issues are less than two years (Table 1) again because 
ofbeing swap driven^. We need further data to see if this is a trend or just the effect 
of the Asia turmoil. 
Table 1 Tenor of new issues ofNon Exchange Fund Paper by year 
| E 3 B I I H H I ^ ^ Q I B ^ E 3 H 9 I I ^ ^ E 9 I I ^ ^ ^ 9 E S | 
Less than 2 years 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 47 
2 - 5 years ‘ 1 0 2 2 19 24 11 12 41 
More than 5 years 0 1 2 11 13 27 9 4 2 
total 1 1 4 14 33 53 20 16 90 
‘In the following descnption msututional dciails arc summanzcd from Umon Bank of Switojrland. 
“Asia Bond Guide: Hong Kong." (July/August 1994): 23-28 
-In September 1998, the HKAIA restncted issues ofHK dollar debt by supranationals of over 3 year to 
combat the accessing ofHong Kong dollars through swaps by currency speculators. Dunng the last 
quarter HK dollar debt dropped substantially. 
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Table 2 Type ofissuers ofNon Exchange Fund Paper by year 
Supranational 1 0 2 6 9 9 7 11 58 
Bank 0 0 1 3 13 38 8 1 13 
Foreign Goverment 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Other 0 1 1 5 10 6 5 4 17 
Total 1 1 4 14 33 53 20 16 90 
Table 3 Rating of new issues ofNon Exchange Fund Paper by year 
AAA - - 2 8 4 3 1 4 49 
AA+ 1 
AA 6 
AA- - - - - - 1 - - -
A+ - - - - - 2 - - -
A - - - - 3 1 1 1 -
A- - - - • • 1 - - • 
Source: Securities Data Corporation : Corporate New Issues Database, 1999 
The Hong Kong Government Exchange Fund Notes and Bills are the most 
liquid fixed rate instrument in the Hong Kong dollar market. The Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority(HKMA) issues the first Exchange Fund Bills and Notes in 
November 1991. As the Hong Kong Government Exchange Funds Notes and Bills 
are the only HKD fixed-income instrument that practically can be sold short in the 
market, Exchange Fund Notes play an important role in the development of the HKD 
fixed-rate market. 
In March 1990, HKMA introduced the Exchange Fund Bills Programme and 
o 
put up for tender regularly bills of 91-, 182-, and 364-day maturity . At the end of 
1996, banks were demanding more Exchange Fund papers for liquidity management, 
in this initial stage of the implementation of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) 
3 Summarized from HKMA website. 
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interbank payment system. With the implement of RTGS, banks can manage the 
intraday liquidity better and therefore, HKMA cut the size of each tap issue ofthe 28-
day Bills from $5 billion to $2 billion. 
In May 1993 and October 1993, two-year and three-year Exchange Fund 
Notes were issued for the first time respectively. In September 1994，inaugural issue 
offive-year Exchange Fund Notes was followed. HKMA also introduced seven-year 
Exchange Fund Notes in November 1995 and ten-year Exchange Fund Notes in 
October 1996. 
The total amount ofExchange Fund Bills and Notes outstanding at the end of 
November 1998 was HKD 97.45 billion. Daily average turnover is around HKD 9 
billion and the trading in these instruments is highly active. See Table 4 and 5. 
Table 4 HONG KONG DOLLAR DEBT EN[STURMENTS 
OUTSTANDES[G 
(HK$ billion) 1996* 1997* 1998* 
Exchange Fund Bills and Notes 91.85 101.65 97.45 
of which: 
Exchange Fund Bills 70.25 72.85 63.85 
Exchange FundNotes 21.60 28.80 33.60 
HK$ debt instruments other than~^ 187.56 243.86 292.66 
EFBN 
of which: 
Floating rate 125.97 167.97 159.53 
Fixed rate 61.59 75.89 133.13 
Total 279.41 345.51 390.11 
*end of year figures. 
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Table 5 Hong Kong Dollar Debt Instruments - NEW ISSUES 
gflC$ billion) i m 1998 
Exchange Fund Bills and Notes (gross issue size) 388.1 316.9 
of which: 
Exchange Fund Bills 376.1 307.3 
Exchange Fund Notes 12.0 9.6 
Private sector debt instruments 99.54 95.75 
of which: 
Floating rate 72.50 18.68 
Fixed rate 27.04 77.07 
Source: HKMA website 
However, we should note that after the Asia economic turmoil, the liquidity of 
the Exchange Fund Note has dropped significantly (see Table 6). This decline in 
liquidity also parallel to the drop of liquidity in stock market. We may explain this by 
the flow of fijnd out of Asia. 
Table 6 Turnover ofExchange Fund Notes 
(Period average daily turnover, HK$ miUion) 
Period Exchange Fund Notes 





Source: HKMA. Monthly Statistical Bulletin (January 1999) 
Hong Kong, a well diversified financial market in terms of products, trading 
flexibility and liquidity, has seen rapid development through the efforts of the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority(HKMA), Hong Kong's equivalent to a Central Bank. 
However, the bond market is still an illiquid one and needs further development. In 
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the following, we will review the structure of this market, in particular, the trading 
and clearing and transaction cost. 
Trading^ 
Hong Kong dollar fixed-rate instruments are traded on an annual yield basis 
net ofany commission and based on actual number of days in a 365-day year. Except 
Exchange Funds Notes, pricing of instrument is achieved by using interest rate swaps 
as a reference with the consideration of the following factors^: 
• Credit rating of the issuer. 
• Distinction between competing issuers based on the experience of issuing levels. 
• Coupon adjustment for high-priced coupon to avoid resistance by investors to too 
high a premium priced paper. 
參 Supply and demand of the paper. 
• Market sentiment. 
Secondary market trading spreads of HKD fixed-rate issues range from 20 to 50 
basis points. Owing to the limited ability of the market to sell short, the market is 
mainly "bid only" and approximately 80% of new issues are placed with investors 
who hold it till maturity. According to UBS, only 20% of new issues would flow 
back to the professional interbank market for trading, but they add that "despite this 
trend, investors place high value on the ability of market professionals to provide 
liquidity, and tend to base the amount of business and measure performance of 
professionals by this yardstick."^ 
4 Summarize from Union Bank ofSwitzerland. "Asia Bond Guide: Hong Kong." Asiamoney (Julv/ August 1994) 23-28 
'Summarized from Chan Hoi Ying, Hong Kong Corporate Bonds. Hong Kong: Chinese University ofHong Kong, 1995 
^ n i o n Bank ofSwitzerland. "Asia Bond Guide: Hong Kong," Asiamoney (July/ August 1994) 23-28 
7 
Hedging Opportunities 
fflBOR to fixed interest rate swap and selling short Exchange Fund Notes provide 
an opportunity for the market makers to hedge against interest rate risk. Because 
most Hong Kong corporations can only borrow money through bank loans, they are 
paying a floating rate of interest, that is HTOOR. If they swap with banks active in 
interest rate swap market, with most corporates wishing to pay fixed in the swap 
market, the largest ultimate payer of floating that is HKMA which wishes to swap out 
t 
of the fixed obligations from their issues of Exchange Fund Notes. Market makers 
can buy a swap with HKMA to hedge interest rate risk if they have bonds on 
portfolio. 
On the other hand, pricing of new issues is enhanced through the liquid swap 
market. In the new issue market of bond, the swap market provides a pricing guide 
line to the new issues. The swap of new issues ofHong Kong bond with USD LEBOR 
indicates that there is spread difference between the two markets. Within the same 
credit rating, it is only worthwhile to swap if the two markets have different spread 
over the riskless rates. Otherwise, it does not make sense to raise fund in Hong Kong 
market and swap to a US market. Therefore, this swap market proves that the two 
markets, Hong Kong bonds and US bonds, are not directly comparable on credit risk. 
Clearing 
In 1990, the HKMA established a new unit, Central Moneymarkets Unit 
(CMU) Service, for HKD debt securities. In December 1993, it replaced the previous 
physical delivery of debt securities issued by private-sector issuers and provide 
computerized clearing and settlement service. It handles debt instruments which are 
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either immobilized or dematerialized. The transfer of title is achieved through 
computer book entry. In December 1994, the CMU linked to the International 
Securities Clearing Systems, Euroclear and Cedel. In December 1996，the Real Time 
Gross Settlement (RTGS) was launched and was linked to the CMU to enable the 
CMU system to provide for its members real-time and end-of-day Delivery versus 
Payment ODvP) services. 
Transaction Costs 
For issuers, listing of new issues takes three to four weeks with application 
and annual fees charged according to issue size. For investors, profits on income 
earned on HKD commercial paper, notes and bonds are taxable in the hands ofHong 
Kong incorporated entities, but profit eamed offshore are not subject to profit tax. 
However, the SAR Government agreed to grant a favorable treatment, Profit Tax 
exemption, to debt instruments issued by certain supranationals. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have introduced the Hong Kong bond market which is small and 
pretty illiquid. I also talked about the Exchange Fund Paper, its market and its role in 
interest rate swap market. Besides, I also talk about the clearing mechanism and the 
transaction ofthe Hong Kong dollar bond market. This form a basis of my study and 
I will further investigate some feature of this market in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTERII 
Valuation of Credit Risk 
In this chapter, we will look at two models that discuss about the valuation of 
credit risk and pricing ofdifferent rating ofbonds. I choose these two to highlight the 
elements in a credit rating and how I can conduct my primary data research on the 
Hong Kong and US bond market. These two model are a methodology called 
CreditMetrics? which is invented by J.P. Morgan and a study of Valuing Like-Rated 
Senior and Subordinated Debt^ by Fridson and Garman. The first one is a 
methodology to evaluate the value-at-risk (VaR) of a portfolio of assets due to 
possibility of default, migration of credit rating and the recovery rate of default. The 
second one is a study that evaluate the credit risk difference of like-rated senior and 
subordinated debt by looking at the expected default loss, difference in risk premium 
in primary and secondary market. Their similarity is that when they look at credit 
risk, they are not only concerned about the default risk, they also consider the severity 
of loss under default. Both probability and severity of loss affect rating. The 
difference of them is that CreditMetrics take the credit rating from agencies as it is 
and calculate VaR from it, while Fridson and Garman doubt the rating by the rating 
agencies. 
7 J.P. Morgan hitroduction to CreditMetrics. New York: 1997 
8 Martin S. Fridson and M. Christopher Garman. "Valuing Like-Rated Senior and Subordinated Debt." 
The Joumal ofFixed hicome (December 1997) 
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In the following, I will first briefly introduce the two models. Then I would 
summarize their finding and what I can learn from them. 
Introducing CreditMetrics 
"CreditMetrics is a tool for assessing portfolio risk due to changes in 
debt value caused by changes in obligor credit quality. It include 
changes in value caused not only by possible default events, but also 
by upgrades and downgrades in credit quality. Also, it assesses the 
VaR - the volatility of value - not just the expected losses. Moreover, 
it assesses risk within the full context of a portfolio. It address the 
correlation of credit quality moves across obligors."^ 
Although the CreditMetrics approach can evaluate credit risk in a portfolio of 
assets, in this paper, I will only discuss the stand alone calculation methodology of 
credit risk. I discuss only the stand alone calculation because I am considering credit 
risk of individual bonds in the two markets. In my methodology, I will compare a 
sample ofthem individually. I f I consider them as a portfolio, I will be looking at the 
market risk instead of the individual credit risk. That is, I am looking at single bond 
pricing in the Hong Kong market vs. US market, but not Hong Kong bonds portfolio 
vs. US bonds portfolio. 
Roadmap of the CreditMetrics approach 
There are three steps to calculating the credit risk for a single bond, as illustrated 
in Figure 1 below: 
• Step 1: We have to find out the possibility of the bond either defaulting or 
migrating to any possible credit quality state at the risk horizon by the senior 
unsecured rating of the bond issuer. 
9 J.P. Morgan hitroduction to CreditMetrics. New York: 1997, p.5 
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• Step 2: We have to fmd out the recovery rate of the bond in case of default by 
determining its seniority. Besides, we use the forward zero curve for each rating 
category to determines the value of bond up(down) grade. With these two 
measures, we can re-evaluate the bond. 
• Step 3: Combining the possibility from Step 1 and the values from Step 2, we can 
calculate the volatility of value due to credit quality change. 
Figure 1 "Road map" of the analytics within CreditMetrics 
Value at Risk due to Credit 
Credit Rating Seniority Credit Spreads 
t I 1 
Rating migration Recovery rate in default Pr^ent value bond 
likelihoods ^ revaluation 
i 1 1 
standard Deviation of value due to credit 
quality changes for a single exposure 
Source: J.P. Morgan. Introduction of CreditMetrics. New York: 1997. 
Three steps to calculate credit risk 
The first step in the CreditMetrics model to calculate credit risk is to find the 
probability of any credit rating migration in the coming period. These probabilities 
are determined by the senior unsecured credit rating of the obligor. The model 
suggests to think the credit quality migration probility as a square table, or transition 
matrix, as show in Table 7. 
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For example, ifabond is graded BBB rating, we should look at the fourth row 
of numbers. The first number in the fourth row said that a BBB grade bond has 
0.02% chance ofmigrate to AAA grade in one year time. 
Table 7 One-year transition matrix (%) 
Initial~~ 一 Rating at year end (%) 
Rating AAA AA ~ " A ~ ~ BBB BB ~ ~ B ~ ~ CCC Default 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ g ^ j J ] _ ^ j j _ _ g ^ : 0 . 0 6 0.12 0.00 _ 0.00 ~~"0.00 
~AA ^ ^ 0 ^ 90.65 7.79 ~ ^ 0 ^ 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.00 
—A ~ ~ 0 ^ 2.27 91.05 5 ^ 0.74' 0.26 0.01 0.06 
~BBB ~"0 .02 0.33 “ 5.95 ~~S6.93 5.30" 1.17 0.12 0.18 
"BB ~~0.03 0.14" 0.67 一 7.73 SO.ST 8.84 1.00 1.06 
"B ~ 0 ^ 0.11 0.24 0.43 6.48 83.46 4.07 5.20 
_ c O . 2 2 | 0 .00| O . 2 2 | 1 . 3 o | 2 . 3 8 | l l . 2 4 | 64.86| 1 ^ ^ 
Source: J.P. Morgan. Introduction of CreditMetrics. New York: 1997. 
In step 2, we need to determine the values at the risk horizon for each of the 
credit quality states. There are two parts in this step. In the first part, we suppose that 
the bond will default and find its rate of recovery. This model suggests that the 
residual value net of recoveries will determine by the seniority class of the bond. 
Using the above example, if the BBB grade bond is senior unsecured, by the below 
Table 8, the recovery rate is 51.13 %. 
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Table 8 Recovery rates by seniority class (% of face value, i.e., "par") 
Seniority Class Mean (%) Standard Deviation (%) 
Senior Secured 53.80 26 86 
Senior Unsecured 51.13 25.45 
Senior Subordinated 38.52 23 81 
Subordinated 32 74 20 18 
Junior Subordinated 17.09 10 90 
Source: Carty & Lieberman - Moody's Investors Service from J.P. Morgan. 
Introduction ofCreditMetrics. New York: 1997. 
The second part of Step 2 is to reevaluate the exposure of each rating category. 
To calculate the exposure, we first obtain the forward zero curves for each rating 
category. The forward curves must start from the risk horizon and go to the maturity 
of the bond. 
Table 9 Example one-year forward zero curves by credit rating category 
Category Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
AAA 3.60 4T7 473 5.12 
AA 3.65 4.22 4.78 5.17 
A 3.72 4.32 4.93 5.32 
BBB 4.10 4.67 5.25 5.63 
BB 5.55 6.02 6.78 7.27 
B 6.05 7.02 8.03 8.52 
CCC 15.05 15.02 14.03 13.52 
Source: J.P. Morgan. Introduction of CreditMetrics. New York: 1997. 
With these one-year forward zero curves, we can discount the cash flow ofthe 
bond and find out the possible exposure value of each credit rating. Again using the 
example before, the BBB grade bond has 6% annual coupon and a face value of $100. 
14 
We use the following formula to find the value at the end of one year if it migrate to 
A grade. 
6 + ^ _ + ^ + - ~ ~ - + . ~ - ~ ~ ^ = 1 0 8 . 6 6 
( l + 3 . 7 2 % ) (1 + 4 . 3 2 % ) 2 (1 + 4.93%)3 ( l + 5 . 3 2 % ) ' 
Now, we know the possibility of all upgrade (downgrade). We also know the 
exposure ofall the stage. We can combine them together to calculate the volatility of 
value due to credit quality changes for this one exposure on a stand-alone basis. 
Table 6 is the BBB grade example we used above. Column 1 is the 
probability of state we find out in Step 1 and column 2 is the exposures we calculate 
using the forward zero curves in Step 2. Timing them together, we find the 
probability weighted value and by this we can find the mean VaR and the standard 
deviation. 
Table 10 Calculating volatility in value due to credit quality changes 
Year-end Probability New bond Probability Difference Probability 
rating of state (%) value plus weighted of value weighted 
coupon ($) value ($) from mean difference 
( ^ squared 
"AAA 0.02 109.37 0.02 2.28 0.0010 
AA 0.33 109.19 0.36 2.10 0.0146 
A 5.59 108.66 6.47 1.57 0.1474 
BBB 86.93 107.55 93.49 0.46 0.1853 
BB 5.30 102.02 5.41 -5.06 1.3592 
B 1.17 98.10 1.15 -8.99 0.9446 
C 0.12 83.64 1.10 -23.45 0.6598 
Default OJ^ 51.13 0 ^ -55.96 5.6358 
Mean= $107.09~~Variance = 8.9477 
Standard deviation 二 $2.99 
Source: J.P. Morgan. Introduction of CreditMetrics. New York: 1997. 
Therefore, the probability weight average of the values across all rating 
categories including default is $107.09. And the value-at-risk is $2.99. 
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Credit Ratings Anomalies 
Next we will look at the study by Fridson and Garman in Valuing Like-Rated 
Senior and Subordinated Debt. In this study, they show that for the same rating of 
senior and subordinated debt, a subordinate debt yields more than a senior debt in 
expected value terms. This is in contrast of the widespread belief. This also shows 
that the credit rating that CreditMetrics is based on and, incidentally, on which many 
investors base their investment decisions, may be misleading. Investors need to be 
critical ofthe credit rating ofabond especially in emerging market like Hong Kong. 
In their paper, they first point out that the two most important dimensions of 
bond valuation are probability of default and severity of default. They also point out 
that a rating scheme only reflects the one of these dimensions is not enough. Then 
they calculate the annual default loss rate of both senior and subordinate bonds and 
find that senior unsecured debts have higher expected loss. 
In the following sections, they find evidence from the primary market and 
secondary market by matching pairs of senior and subordinate bonds and find out 
their spread differential. They find out that the senior bonds have a higher risk 
premium than the subordinate bonds in both markets. This means that the senior 
bonds should rated lower grade in credit rating. They offered an explanation that 
most market practitioners have their own credit rating of each bond. The practitioners 
do not follow the rating of the credit agencies. 
Application of Bond Analysis to the H0n2 Kong Market 
There is a common theme in the two approaches that credit risk calculation 
should not concentrate only on default risk, but also the on the recovery rate (that is 
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the severity of default in the Fridson and Garman's study). This is an important 
theme in my study because I would like to suggest that there are many components in 
credit risk calculation, a single letter to represent the whole rating may not be a 
altogether fair one. 
However, there is a main difference between these two approaches, as I 
mentioned before. That is the CreditMetrics model take the credit risk rating by credit 
agencies as a given stage and then find the migration and default probability from the 
rating. Hence, calculate the value-at-risk. On the other hand, the Fridson and 
Garman's study question the reliability of the credit rating by the credit rating 
agencies. They used annual default loss rate and differences in spread differential to 
support the evidence that the rating is not fair. 
I got the idea of my Hong Kong and US bonds comparison from the Fridson 
and Garman's study. My thinking is that within the same sovereign, when there is 
less credit risk components to consider, the credit rating can be shown wrong. Now, 
Hong Kong and USA are two totally different markets，the chance for incomparable 
credit rating is even larger. Therefore, I decided to compare Hong Kong and US 
bonds pricing and credit rating. 
The CreditMetrics model approach highlights a shortcoming of my study: my 
comparison spread differential in Chapter IV should be compare to the zero-coupon 
yield curves of the same rating as the bond. Because the zero-coupon yield curves are 
calculate from single payment discount bonds, “ it may be possible to extract required 
credit premium and implied probabilities of default from actual market data on 
interest rate."^° That is the risk premium of a corporate single payment discount bond 
over Treasury may reflect perceived credit risk exposures of corporate borrowers for 
10 Anthony Saunders. Fianacial histitutions Management. USA:Lrwin/ McGraw-Hill, 1997 
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single payments at different times in the future. Figure 2 shows the spread between 
corporate bonds and Treasury. 
Figure 2 Yield spreads between corporate debt and T-bonds, 1980-1995 
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However, I have not used a risk-less zero-coupon yield curves, that is the 
Treasury Notes and Exchange Fund Notes curves, because there is leak of historical 
data for the corporate curve in the Hong Kong market. Besides, there are not enough 
issues in Hong Kong market to construct different rating yield curves. Therefore, I 
accept the risk-less yield to maturity. If credit ratings accurately reflect credit risk 
perceived by investors and of investors pricing is constant across markets, the 
differential between the risk-less yield to maturity and corporate curves should be 
constant among the US bonds and Hong Kong bonds. 
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CHAPTER i n 
METHODOLOGY OF HONG KONG BOND RATEVG 
"A global rating scale imposes a consistent, common discipline on all cross-
border analysis, while still allowing the assement of an issuer in its local 
context. Standard & Poor's weighs the diverse national considerations, but 
expresses its rating on a single scale so that debtholders can compare issues of 
equivalent credit quality." 
~ Standard & Poor's Rating Methodology^^ 
Above is the principle of Standard & Poor's to rate an international bond. As 
it claims, an AAA rated Hong Kong dollar bond should bear the same risk as of an 
AAA rated U.S. bond. However, an Hong Kong bond, just like other international 
bond，will bear some kinds of risk that does not occur to an U.S. bond. The rating 
mechanism of an international bond will be discussed in this chapter. 
I choose to analyze the Standard and Poor's methodology because the primary 
data testing in the next chapter is based on a Standard and Poor's rating. In next 
chapter, I will show that there appears to be larger differentials between USD and 
HKD bond spreads, a fact that casts doubt on the quote above from Standard & 
Poor's. Therefore, to be consistent with the rating scale I used, I choose to analyze 
the methodology of Standard and Poor's. 
I do not attack the methodology of any special rating agency. But I would like 
to show that, rating an issue or an issuer is a complicated and difficult job. There is 
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no single letter rating can comprehend all the aspects of a credit risk rating, no matter 
how sophisticated the methodology used. Besides, during the rating process, there 
may be human errors and subjective judgement build into the final result. Hence the 
rating may not truly reflect the credit risk of a bond. 
Rating at a Global Perspective 
Standard and Poor's uses the same rating methodology to analyze issues or 
issuers all around the world. Both business risk and financial risk are evaluated with 
the firm's financial profile and policies. If the regional environment adds risks to the 
firm's operation, they will incorporate the risk into the analysis. 
One thing must be noted is that in evaluating international firms, it will use 
issuers' financial statements according to the prevailing local standard. As long as 
these financial statements meet international standards and are audited by an 
internationally recognized audit firm, they will not change or ask the issuers to change 
it into USA GAAP. This is a source of problems because there are many differences 
in countries accounting standard. The question about disclosure is one ofthem. 
Business Risk 
The analysis ofbusiness risk includes the assessment of an issuer's economic, 
operational, and competitive environment. The difference in environment in different 
country, like geographical and industrial mix, calls for attention. The market for the 
industry is examined and domestic and international markets are both evaluated. For 
companies in export-oriented countries, emphasis is placed on a firm's ability to 
11 The following discussion is based primarily on information from Standard and Poor's website 
http:/www.standardpoor.com. 
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withstand local currency appreciation and the country's affectiveness towards trade 
protectionism. Besides, the role of regulation and legislation, actual and potential, 
must be considered. 
Financial risk 
Assessment of financial risk by Standard and Poor's includes earning 
protection, cash flow adequacy, asset quality, use of debt leverage, and financial 
flexibility. Problems arise when they compare these qualities from accounting 
statement in different accounting practices. However, analysts base the analysis on 
the original accounting framework. In my opinion, this is a source of bias because it 
is hard to treat different frameworks fairly and compare them on an equal terms. 
However, in the document, Standard & Poor's emphasize that they base their 
analysis on "real" stocks and flows, that is, levels of debt, cash, and cash flow. They 
are less concerned with earnings and net worth despite the economic meaning they 
have. This is because different depreciation or revaluation policies can result in 
significant distortions. 
Balance-sheet distortion 
An example of balance-sheet distortion is the treatment of goodwill. Some 
countries tend to write up goodwill and some tend to amortize it. Therefore, it 
requires great caution to compare these two types of accounting statements. Asset 
valuation practices is another example of balance-sheet distortion. There is no easy 
way to compare companies that revalue their assets with those that do not. In this 
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case, Standard and Poor's analyst will consider the realizable values o f a company's 
assets under reasonable conservative assumptions. 
Net debt 
In many countries, for example in Japan, local practice is to maintain a high 
level of debt while holding a large portfolio of cash and marketable securities. 
However, the cash flow ofinterest to the debt and interest to the capital can be offset. 
So, the analyst will consider company's liquidity position, normal working cash 
needs, nature of shot-term borrowings, and funding philosophy on a case-by-case 
method. This is an example of business practice differences affecting credit rating 
methods. However, business practice is due to subjective judgement and will easily 
build in errors in the rating system. 
Earnings differences 
Shareholder pressure and accounting standards in certain countries, like USA, 
will lead managers to seek to maximize profits on a quarter-to-quarter or short-term 
basis. This same practice is likely to occur in Hong Kong. However, in some 
countries, managers seek to "smooth" their earning over time. Again, this is an 
example of that different business practice affects credit rating. 
Contingent liabilities 
Off-balance sheet obligations can often be significant and need differing 
methods of calculations. So, this imposed a difficulty in evaluating international 
bonds. Another problem is the pension of the staffs. Some of the countries reflect 
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them on the balance sheet and some of the countries do not. Therefore contingent 
liabilities is a result ofdifferent account practice in difference countries and may built 
in a source of error in the rating system. 
Other national and regional factors 
Many international corporate issuers benefit from their status within the country 
or region ofdomicile. Analysts take this into account while consider the credit rating 
the following factors. 
• State ownership - a state-owned corporate will not automatically carry the same 
level of credit risk as its sovereign owner. But it may have advantage that the 
government will support them more readily. 
• Local ownership blocks — there are company group ownership and have both 
positive and negative implications. In many cases, a company may benefit from 
operating relationships or greater access to financing. However, there is 
possibility that a firm have to support its weaker company in the group. 
• Access to local sources of capital - A firm's position within its home country's 
financial community is also considered. Large companies in a small country often 
have advantage in attracting finance from the banking system. 
Country risk: Emerging markets 
In emerging markets, country risk has special importance. "To achieve a local 
currency corporate rating higher than the sovereign foreign currency rating would 
mean that the corporate can service its debts even under a scenario so sever that it 
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causes the government to default on its foreign currency debt."^^ This is to say the 
corporation not only survives as an on going concern, but also repay its debt in 
conditions like inflation, currency devaluation and fiscal crisis that the sovereign 
government bankrupts. However, even Standard and Poor's analysts think this is very 
unlikely to happen because the economic and political factor that affect the 
government also affect the corporation. 
Now, in consistence with the above evaluation technique, let's look at the 
country risk according to business risk factors and financial risk factors. Since the 
factors are rather self-explanatory, I will list them out and do not use further words to 
analyze them. 
Business risk factors 
• Macroeconomic volatility - to look into the country's history to see is it volatile in 
the macro-environment. 
• Access to imported raw materials - to see if the country depend on import 
supplies heavily so that it will be interrupt by foreign-exchange control. 
• Exchange rate risk - to see if the exchange is volatile which could affect the 
earning of the industries. 
• Government regulation - to see if the government will imposed any restriction on 
import/ export or other intervention that will change the shape of the industries. 
• Taxes/ royalties/ duties - to see it the company is receiving subsidies on tax, or the 
government will use tax as a tool to impose policy. 
• Legal issues — to see if the legal system is transparent. 
• Labor issues - to see if there will be strikes or dispute among the labor. 
i2standard&Poor'sCorporation. Standard & Poor,s Rating Methodology. 1998. 
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• Infrastructure problems — to see if there are potential bottlenecks, poor transport, 
high-cost/inefficient port services. 
• Changing tariff barriers/ trade blocs/ subsidies 
• Corruption issues - to see if there is practice of corruption in the country. 
• Terrorism - Are there risks of attacks on the companies facilities? 
• Industry structure/ operating environment - to see if the environment is favorable 
to the specific industry. 
Financial risk factors 
• Financial policy: 
> Disclosure/ local accounting standards issues — because S & P do not translate 
accounting statements, the financial statement must be examined carefully. 
> Foreign-exchange risks - to see if the company hedge foreign-exchange risks 
and is that under control. 
> Family/ group ownership issues - if a family or a group own the company, 
will it affect the company negatively 
• Profitability/ cash flow: 
> Potential price controls - will there be a threat to local goods or services? 
> Inflation/ currency fluctuation risk - when there is high inflation, will the 
company able to earn profit under that situation? 
> Restricted access to subsidiary cash flow - Will the foreign subsidiary cash 
flow be interrupted? 
• Capital structure/ financial flexibility: 
> Inflation accounting - Does local accounting tend to overstate fixed asset 
values that lead to imcomparable ratios? 
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> Devaluation risk - Does the currency under risk of devaluation? 
> Access to capital - Does the company have access to international money 
market? 
> Debt maturity structure — Is the debt of the company all short term? 
> Liquidity restrictions - Is the liquid asset of the company held in government 
position and can it assess them? 
The rating mechanism of Standard & Poor's is sophisticated but there are still 
possibilities of errors in it. Some errors are built into the process, because, for 
example, different accounting standards are hard to compare. Some other errors are 
incurred during the process of rating, like mistakes by analysts. Especially in 
emerging market, credit ratings are harder to access. Therefore, I will look into the 
Hong Kong market and compare it with US market, in next chapter, to see the extent 
to which credit ratings reflect market returns. 
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CHAPTER TV 
COMPARISON BETWEEN HONG KONG BOND AND US BOND 
OF SAME CREDIT RATEVG 
In the previous chapters, I have briefly introduced the Hong Kong bond 
market. I also summarized the components of credit risk — probability of default and 
upgrade (downgrade) — discussed in the CreditMetrics methodology and by referring 
to credit agency rating problems highlighted in the study by Fridsona and Garman. I 
then summarized the approach of rating an international bond - included Hong Kong 
bonds - by Standard & Poor's. That summary showed ample opportunity for 
distortions in determining credit ratings. In this chapter, I do an empirical comparison 
between Hong Kong and US bonds. I show in this chapter that the risk premium is 
higher in Hong Kong bond than the same rated US bond. I also provide some 
explanations, from my point of view, for this phenomenon. 
Methodology 
I select five Hong Kong bonds that are A rated from an investment banks 
databasei3. j then observe their offer yield spread from the five year Hong Kong 
Exchange Fund Bills at each month end from March 1998 to December 1998. 
Totally, there are ten months of end data for each bonds. The Hong Kong Exchange 
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Fund Bill's yield should include the risk free rate of interest, exchange risk and 
sovereign risk. 
Then I match each Hong Kong bond with an US bond of the same rating and a 
maturity within six month of that Hong Kong bond. To strive for homogeneity, I 
draw the test sample excluding floating-rate, payment-in-kind, multicoupon，callable 
and puttable bonds. I further refine the selection criteria to eliminate zero-coupon 
issues. I select the bonds from a fixed-income database and print out the yield from 
Bloombergi4. The next step is to find the yield spread of each bond from five year 
Treasury ofeach month end from March 98 to December 98. The five year Treasury 
should represent the risk free rate of interest. Because these are US bonds, I consider 
there are no exchange rate risks and sovereign risks. 
For each matched pair, I compare the spread of each month end and find the 
difference. I consider the spreads are the corporate risk premium and the difference 
between matched bonds in the US and Hong Kong market is the difference in 
corporate risk premium in the two markets. Then, I find out all ten months difference 
for each bonds and calculate their average in the below Table 4. 
The result 
We can see from the below table, the averages of four out of five pairs are 
positive. That means Hong Kong bonds, in this sample, have higher risk premium 
than US same rated bonds. We can find the mean of the average difference is 113 
basis point and the standard deviation is 90.38 basis point. Using the t-test of 
statistics, we can have a 90% confidence that the Hong Kong exceed 50.64 basis point 
than US bonds. 
13 The investment bank,active in HKD fixed income market, has requested to remain anonymous. 
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From these results, we can say that Hong Kong bonds have a higher risk 
premium than US bonds. That means, ifthe bonds were being priced in the same way 
in both markets the Hong Kong bonds should rate lower than the rating now, given by 
Standard & Poor,s. Although the sample size is a little bit small, but the model is 
statistically sound. We are 90% sure that Hong Kong bonds have a higher risk Table 
premium than the US bonds. Does this means that, even within the same credit rating, 
there are different credit risk associated with Hong Kong and US bonds? 
Discussion of the data set 
Before looking at the explanation of the results, we look at the data ofthe test 
first. Within the data set, there is an interesting period at August 1998. At that time 
there is a bond spread blowout in the US market. Most of the bond yield, both 
government and corporate, drop significantly around 17 August. The benchmark 30 
year Treasury yield fell to 5.54%, the lowest mark since the Treasury Department 
began issue 30-year fixed-maturity securities in 1977i5. This happened because the 
weakness in US stock market and investor are searching for safety. 
It drop even more in 22 August because the Russian Federation's decision to 
launch a managed devaluation of the rouble while simultaneously imposing a 90-day 
moratorium on debt principal p a y m e n t s . The yield of the 30-year Treasury has 
dropped to 5.39%. Analyst forecast that it would even drop to 5%. Besides investors 
searching for safety, the low interest environment also contribute to the market low. 
However, in our data set, we find that the bond spread has recover at the 
month end ofAugust 1998. Therefore, I believe that the blowout do not affect my test 
significantly. 
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Explanations of the result 
Then one question arise, what is the result mean for the Hong Kong corporations? 
As a researcher in finance, I will offer some of the explanations towards this 
phenomena. Some ofthe reasons for a higher risk premium ofHong Kong bonds are 
as followed: 
• Under estimate ofHong Kong sovereign risk 
• Premium for illiquidity 
• Higher interest rate in Hong Kong after economic turmoil — interest rate risk 
I will discuss these points in detail in this chapter. 
Under estimate of Hong Kong sovereign risk 
After July 1997, Hong Kong has returned to China and becomes a Special 
Administrative Region. China has long been a closed economy and only open up for 
the Western investment in recent years. Besides, China has a totally different 
tradition and business practice than the Western society. Therefore, the rating 
agencies do not have throughout understanding of the risk involved in doing business 
with China. Thus, they may assume a lower risk in dealing with China relative to 
what investors perceive. 
A 
Hong Kong is now a part of China. Although under the "one country two 
system", Hong Kong is said to be unchanged in fifty years. But it is unavoidable for 
Hong Kong to affect by China's politics and economy. However, the rating agency 
have not changed Hong Kong's rating after the return. Moreover, the "Hong Kong 
people ruling Hong Kong" policy seems to have many crisis after the turnover of 
15 Gregory Zuckerman. “Treasury，Price Show Solid Rise." The Wall Street JoumaI(17 August, 1998) 
16 "US Treasuries - aU time low" JFR (22 August, 1998) 
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Hong Kong. Even Hong Kong citizens have less confidence for Hong Kong by 
public survey. The political independence ofHong Kong is in doubt for some people. 
For example, the residency of offspring in China of Hong Kong has raise great 
argument between sectors of the society, and even Chinese government. Policies like 
these can greatly affect the stability and economy of Hong Kong. These may affect 
spreads of corporations over Hong Kong's sovereign risk. 
Premium for illiquidity 
There is no formal exchange market for the Hong Kong corporate bonds and 
they are mainly traded over the counter. The main practitioners are large 
corporations, banks and fund managers. Personal buyers seldom have the chance to 
buy a bond. This is because the wholesale buyers already buy the bonds and hold it to 
maturity. Hence, there are not even quote for the small buyers. Therefore, the Hong 
Kong bond market is very illiquid. Some of the Hong Kong corporate bonds have no 
transaction in weeks and even month. The bond buyers usually hold the bond till it 
maturity. 
For this kind of market, it is hard to sell a bond even when you do not want to 
hold the bond any more. This is a liquidity risk and may need a higher premium for 
the risk. In contrast, the US bond market is very active and even small buyer can 
participate in it. Although the rating agency do not rate the liquidity risk of the bond 
market, the investors do. They may consider that they require a liquidity premium, 
even though they concur with the rating agency ratings. 
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Interest rate risk 
After the Asian economic turmoil, the interest rate market is very unstable and 
has been under attack for several times. The HffiOR had gone up to two digit number 
four times. The interest rate will severely affect the repaying ability ofthe borrower. 
High interest rates will lead to high default rates. Unstable interest rate will affect the 
repaying ability ofthe bond issuer. Because the interest rate is volatile in Hong Kong, 
therefore the interest rate risk is high for corporations. 
One problem is that we discovered the interbank lending market could easily 
be affect by foreign attack. The investors are watching the interest rate market closely 
to avoid loses. The interest rate disorder has not reflected in the yield of the 
Exchange Fund Bills. However, it will affect the corporate bond repaying ability a 
lot. While in the United States, the interest rate is pretty stable over time. Therefore, 
interest rate risk premium may be charge to the Hong Kong bond as the interest rate 





To summarize, I have introduced the Hong Kong dollar fixed income market 
as a small but sophisticated market in Chapter I. I have also introduced the market 
mechanism ofthis market. It has an outstanding amount ofHKD 390.11 billion at the 
end of 1998. HKMA, the Central bank of Hong Kong, has actively encouraged the 
supply ofhigh quality debt paper in Hong Kong. As I mentioned before, Hong Kong 
market is illiquid but the investors place high value on the ability of market 
professionals to provide liquidity. 
In Chapter E, I have introduced the CreditMetircs approach to evaluate credit 
risk by value-at-risk (VaR) and a study by Fridson and Garman that challenge the 
credit rating agencies. The two approaches both consider credit risk not only the risk 
ofdefault, but also the severity of default and the migration possibility. However, the 
CreditMetrics approach takes the rating as it is and calculates the VaR from it. While 
Fridson and Garman show bonds with equivalent credit rating yield different expected 
values and that the rating by agencies are not "right". 
In Chapter EI, I reviewed the S&P rating methodology. The rating of a non-
US issuer should have measure the same risk as the same rated US issuer but this may 
not be carried out in practice. However, in this chapter I introduced the element of 
credit risk of a foreign issuer which included business risk, financial risk and country 
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risk. This is a base ofthe following chapter test because we understand more how a 
rating agency rates an international bond. 
In Chapter IV, I provided a test that showed Hong Kong bonds have a higher 
risk premium than the same rated US bond. That is to say the Hong Kong bond either 
should rate lower or that credit markets are segmented. This is a simple methodology 
but is fair to compare matched pair ofbonds and is statistically sound. I also provide 
explanations for the result. Although my explanations points to credit market 
segmentation, I have also shown that the bond rating agencies, methods are not 
complete and their methods may be not fair to the country that the tradition is 
different from the US. I hope that this study can bring to the attention of practitioners 
and scholars credit market segmentation and raise the issue of fairness ofcredit rating 
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